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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress enacted the Maritime Drug Law Enforce-
ment Act (MDLEA), stating that "trafficking in controlled sub-
stances aboard vessels is a serious international problem [that] is
universally condemned... and presents a specific threat to the
security and societal well-being of the United States."2 Congress,
in enacting this provision, intended for the statute to reach acts
committed outside the territorial boundaries and jurisdiction of
the United States.' The Circuit Courts of Appeals have split on
whether, when applying the MDLEA extraterritorially, there is a
requirement of showing a nexus between the conduct of the defen-
dant and the United States in order for such application not to be
arbitrary, fundamentally unfair, or inconsistent with due process.4
The 2006 Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Perlaza held
that such a nexus was a condition precedent to applying the
MDLEA in order to ensure the application of that statute to the
defendant was not arbitrary and fundamentally unfair.5
1. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act [MDLEA], 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1904
(2002). In October 2006, Congress repealed the MDLEA as it was previously codified
in the appendix of Title 46 of the United States Code and recodified it as part of Title
46 itself. The new form, which maintains the same policies and prohibitions and, in
fact, much of the same wording, can be found at 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70501-70507 (2006).
This new codification was effectuated by An Act To Complete the Codification of Title
46, United States Code, "Shipping", as Positive Law, Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat.
1685 (2006). However, since all cases cited in this paper cite to the old codification of
the MDLEA, this paper will do so as well. These cases still represent good law as the
new codification is on point with the old.
2. Id. § 1902.
3. See id. § 1903(h).
4. Compare United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States is required) with
United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
jurisdiction is proper even if there is no nexus between defendant's activities and the
United States).
5. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Applying the MDLEA to a foreign defendant apprehended on
the high seas or in foreign waters who has no ties to the United
States would seem to offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'6 If minimum contacts with a forum state are
required within the United States for a state court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,7 a similar and
analogous idea should apply to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
United States over a nonresident, noncitizen defendant in a prose-
cution under the MDLEA.
Part II of this paper contains an overview of trends in the law
regarding the MDLEA and presents several cases that fall on
other side of the debate regarding whether a nexus is required.
Part III discusses international law concepts that relate to the
MDLEA and the function of those concepts in the application of
jurisdiction by the United States. Part IV discusses the power of
the United States Congress to enact the MDLEA. Part V
addresses the limits on personal jurisdiction within the United
States and among the several States and analogizes those limits
to prosecutions under the MDLEA. Lastly, Part VI speaks to due
process, personal jurisdiction and the application of the MDLEA
extraterritorially to nonresident aliens using the Perlaza decision
as an example.
II. OVERVIEW OF TRENDS IN THE LAW REGARDING THE
MARITIME DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT AND
UNITED STATES JURISDICTION
Previous cases involving the MDLEA have not all been consis-
tent regarding the need for proving a nexus to the United States
as a prerequisite to a finding of proper jurisdiction. While Ninth
Circuit cases such as United States v. Davis8 have required a
nexus in order for a federal criminal statute to apply extraterrito-
rially consistent with the Due Process Clause,9 a significant num-
6. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1941)).
7. See, e.g. id.; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291
(1980).
8. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49.
9. See Timothy M. Morrison, United States v. Suerte: The Fifth Circuit Fails to
Address International Law Principles in Examining Due Process Concerns Raised
Under the Extraterritorial Application of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 27
TUL. MAR. L.J. 631, 636-39 (2003).
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ber of cases have not made such a requirement." Respect for the
law of nations and the territorial integrity of sovereign nations
would, in the opinion of this author, seem to require such a nexus
in order to make the application of United States jurisdiction rea-
sonable, logical, and just.
United States v. Davis, while ultimately finding jurisdiction to
exist, explicitly stated that "[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a
federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due pro-
cess, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and
the United States so that such application would not be arbitrary
or fundamentally unfair."" That case also addressed the restric-
tions on applying Congress' acts extraterritorially, specifically the
requirement that Congress make clear its intent that an act such
as the MDLEA apply extraterritorially, and that such application
does not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2
The court in Davis found that Congress did explicitly intend for
the MDLEA to apply outside the territory of the United States 3
and that a sufficient nexus existed in order to prosecute the defen-
dant under it.
4
However, as recently as 2006, the Eleventh Circuit has held
in multiple cases that the MDLEA has not been "embellished"
with the requirement of a nexus between a defendant's criminal
conduct and the United States." In United States v. Moreno, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the
MDLEA 'represented an ultra vires exercise of Congressional
power under the Piracies and Felonies Clause.. .""' That court
then went on to cite United States v. Ledesma-Cuesta 7 for the pro-
10. See, e.g. United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 376 (5th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).
11. Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49 (citing United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493
(9th Cir. 1987)).
12. See id. at 248.
13. Id.; see also Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act [MDLEA], 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1903(h) (2002) ("This section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or
distribution outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.").
14. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 ("'Where an attempted transaction is aimed at
causing criminal acts within the United States, there is a sufficient basis for the
United States to exercise its jurisdiction"' (quoting Peterson, 812 F.2d at 493)).
15. United States v. Moreno, 199 F. App'x 839, 840 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003)).
16. Id. (quoting United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006));
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
17. See id. (citing United States v. Ledesma-Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527, 532 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the defendant's crime of
possession of narcotics even though defendant was found as a stow-away aboard a
merchant ship while the ship was not in the United States' customs waters)).
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position that since Congress had authority to enact the MDLEA
and since the trafficking of narcotics is universally condemned by
law abiding nations, there is no reason to conclude that it is "fun-
damentally unfair" for Congress to punish those caught with nar-
cotics on the high seas. s
The Eleventh Circuit ruled similarly in United States v. Gar-
cia.9 In Garcia, the court upheld the conviction under the
MDLEA of a Guatemalan citizen apprehended on a Guatemalan
boat in international waters2 ° and affirmed the district court's
finding that enactment of the MDLEA was a valid exercise of Con-
gress's power under the Piracies and Felonies Clause.2 The Elev-
enth Circuit also affirmed the district court's findings that that
Clause did not limit Congress's extraterritorial power to only
those felonies with a nexus to the United States.22 The Eleventh
Circuit cited to cases from the Ninth and Third Circuits, which
held similarly.2'
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS APPLICABLE TO
JURISDICTION UNDER THE MARITIME DRUG
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
A. Bases for Jurisdiction in International Law
Under international law, there is an important distinction
made between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate and enforce.24 Jurisdiction to prescribe allows a nation to
make its laws applicable to foreign nationals, whereas jurisdiction
to adjudicate allows that nation to bring foreign offenders in front
18. See id. (citing Ledesma-Cuesta, 347 F.3d at 532 (quoting United States v.
Martinez-Hidalgo, 933 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993))).
19. See United States v. Garcia, 182 F. App'x 873 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
where defendant was a Guatemalan citizen aboard a Guatemalan boat that was
intercepted and boarded by the United States Coast Guard in international waters,
the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida was proper).
20. See id. at 874.
21. See id. (holding that the Piracies and Felonies Clause granted to Congress "the
power to define and punish offenses committed on the high seas"); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
22. See id. (holding that a nexus between the United States and offense conduct
under the MDLEA is not required).
23. See id. at 876 (citing United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824 (9th
Cir. 2003) and Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (distinguishing between jurisdiction to
prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate).
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of its national tribunals or administrative agencies, regardless of
whether or not the nation is a party to the proceeding.25 Jurisdic-
tion to enforce is then the power of the nation to "compel compli-
ance or to punish noncompliance with its laws."26 The limitations
placed on a nation's ability to subject foreigners to its laws differ
from the limitations that govern a nation's jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate and punish those who break those laws.27
There are five recognized bases under which a nation has the
right to prescribe law.2" The first, the objective territorial princi-
ple, allows a nation to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction29 where
the offense occurred in one country, but had an effect in the coun-
try asserting jurisdiction." The nationality principle allows a
nation to assert jurisdiction where the offender is a citizen of that
nation. 1 Under the passive personality principle, the nation may
assert jurisdiction where the victim is a citizen of the nation.2
The last two bases for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction are
the two discussed most often in reference to prosecutions under
the MDLEA: the protective principle and the universality princi-
ple, also known as universal jurisdiction.
After upholding the defendant's conviction in United States v.
Garcia, the court there discussed both the protective principle and
the idea of universal jurisdiction, which had previously been cited
by the Eleventh Circuit as further sources of authority to enact
the MDLEA and apply it extraterritorially 4 Prior case law has
upheld Congress's ability to enact legislation under the protective
principle, which "permits a nation to assert jurisdiction over a per-
son whose conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the
nation's security or could potentially interfere with the operation
25. See id. §§ (a)-(b).
26. See id. § (c).
27. See id. § 401 cmt. a.
28. See id. § 402.
29. In this paper, the term "extraterritorial" is presumed to mean outside a
country's territorial boundary lines; "extraterritorial jurisdiction" means the ability of
a government to exercise authority beyond its national boundaries.
30. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement of Chris Swecker Before the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Dec. 13, 2005, http:l!
www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05.htm (follow hyperlink for Dec. 13, 2005 testimony);
see also 151 CONG. REc. D1276-01, *D1278 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2005).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.; see also United States v. Garcia, 182 F. App'x 873, 876-77 (11th Cir.
2006).
34. See Garcia, 182 Fed. App'x at 876-877.
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of its governmental functions."35 This principle of jurisdiction does
not require proof of an actual or intended effect within the terri-
tory of the United States; it is enough if the conduct "'has a poten-
tially adverse effect and is generally recognized as a crime by
nations that have reasonably developed legal systems.' "36
"Universal jurisdiction is a doctrine of international law
allowing states to define and punish certain crimes considered to
be of 'universal concern"' as recognized by the community of
nations.17 These crimes are typically thought to be of a finite num-
ber and an atrocious nature. Under the concept of universal
jurisdiction, a state may define and punish one of those certain
offenses even where none of the other bases of international juris-
diction are present. 9 This basis for authority is therefore incredi-
bly far-reaching when exercised properly. Currently, drug
trafficking, even when done across national borders, is not listed
in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law as a crime
which may be defined and punished under universal jurisdiction. 0
However, given the increase in drug trafficking and the steps
taken to prevent it,4 it is not hard to concede that in the future
such offense may well become a universally condemned crime
properly punishable on the foundation of universal jurisdiction.42
B. Limiting the Bases for Jurisdiction in
International Law
While current international law takes the position that juris-
diction to prescribe is not based on minimum contacts, but instead
35. United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing United
States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir.1985)).
36. Garcia, 182 F. App'x at 876 (quoting Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 939).
37. Id. at 876 (quoting Herero People's Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G.,
370 F.3d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 987 (2004)).
38. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 404 (listing "piracy, slave trade, attacks on
or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism"
as crimes punishable under the theory of universal jurisdiction).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See e.g. Asa Hutchinson, U.S. Dep't of State, International Drug Trafficking
and Terrorism, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information by DEA Administrator ASA
HUTCHINSON, MAR. 13, 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/2002/9239.htm (stating
that "[olne of DEA's priorities is to target the powerful international drug trafficking
organizations"); see also 148 CONG. REc. S1866-01, *S1866-1867 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
2002).
42. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 404 cmt. a (discussing expanding the class
of universal offenses by "widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of
international organizations . . . [and] as a matter of customary law").
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on a concept of reasonableness to be determined by looking at a
multitude of factors,4 3 it seems only just that one of those factors
be the defendant's contacts with the forum and/or the effect his
conduct will have on that nation. This seems all the more impera-
tive when speaking of jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce. It is
one thing for the United States Congress to make a law applicable
to foreign nationals, but it is quite another to then say that an
offender who violates that law outside the territorial boundaries of
the United States, who has no contacts with the United States,
and whose conduct has no effect on the United States, can be
haled into a United States court and forced to defend himself in a
foreign jurisdiction.
Conceding arguendo that Congress was justified in extending
application of the MDLEA to nonresident, noncitizen foreign
nationals, the exercise of jurisdiction over such a person in a
United States court is not reasonable.' The Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law lists eleven conditions that make the
exercise of jurisdiction over such a person reasonable.45 These
conditions correspond directly or analogously to the conditions
necessary for one U.S. state to exercise jurisdiction over a citizen
of another state under the rule set forth in International Shoe.6
These conditions, or factors, developed to protect the defendant in
the same way that the Due Process Clause protects a domestic
defendant.47 Even if the MDLEA confers seemingly worldwide
jurisdiction, it would only meet the requirements of due process
and of international law when one or more of these conditions are
met. Along with giving adequate notice to the defendant, this
would ensure fairness.4"
43. See id. § 403.
44. Cf id. § 421(1) ("A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to
adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the relationship of the state to the
person or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.").
45. See id. § 421(2) (listing, among other things, that jurisdiction is reasonable if
the person or thing is present in the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction; if the
person is domiciled or is a resident of the state; if the person is a national of the state;
if a ship that relates to the case is registered under the laws of the state; if the person
carries on business in the state; if the person carried on an activity that had a
substantial, direct and foreseeable effect within the state).
46. Compare id. (setting forth multiple conditions under which the exercise of
jurisdiction would be proper), with Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945) (stating that a corporation that conducts activities within the forum state,
enjoys the benefits and privileges of that state, and has obligations connected to its
activities in that state is amenable to suit in the courts of that state).
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 421 reporters' note 1.
48. See id. reporters' note 9.
648
MDLEA JURISDICTION
IV. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENACT THE MARITIME
DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
The general rule regarding Congressional legislation is that,
absent a contrary intent, United States laws are construed to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.49
However, when Congress passed the MDLEA, they made their
intent for the statute to reach acts of defendants outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States expressly known in the text
of the statute." In addition to the constraints imposed by interna-
tional law, Congress, when promulgating legislation that is to
apply outside the United States, is curtailed by the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, including the requirement of
due process.51
The ability to punish drug trafficking under the MDLEA
seemingly stems from the Piracies and Felonies Clause of Article I
of the United States Constitution,52 which states that Congress
has the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit-
ted on the high Seas and Offenses against the Law of Nations."53
This power has been exercised by Congress since 1790. 54 Chief
Justice Marshall, in United States v. Palmer, even went so far as
to say that since the Constitution confers such power on Congress,
"there can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws
punishing pirates, although they might be foreigners, and may
have committed no particular offense against the United States."55
His view in that case is bolstered by the current understanding of
universal jurisdiction, which includes piracy as one of the crimes
recognized to be of universal concern by the community of
49. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (citation omitted).
50. See Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act [MDLEA], 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(h)
(2002) ("This section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or
distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.").
51. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 402 cmt. j; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 5-6 (1957) (declaring that any exercise of authority by the United States is subject
to constitutional limitations); RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 721 cmt. f.
52. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 632 ("The specific reference to actions taken on
the 'high seas' [in the Piracies and Felonies Clause] naturally extends Congress's
reach to regulate behavior outside the territory of the United States." (citation
omitted)).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
54. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 632-34. In 1790, the First Congress passed An
Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, which allowed
for persons who committed murder or robbery on the high seas to be adjudged a pirate
and felon and, if convicted, sentenced to death. This statute was intended to be
applied extraterritorially. See id.
55. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630 (1818).
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nations.56
While Chief Justice Marshall's view in Palmer may have at
one time been the prevailing view on extraterritorial jurisdiction,
it seems that in light of the changes in the Supreme Court's view
on personal jurisdiction among the several states,57 there must be
a corresponding change in regards to United States jurisdiction
over foreigners located abroad. Since the Piracies and Felonies
Clause appears to give to Congress an enormous amount of power
to act outside the territorial boundaries of the United States, that
power cannot be without limit or else Congress is ostensibly given
a blank check to police the world.
That limit should be on the ability of the courts of the United
States to hear cases under extraterritorially-applied acts like the
MDLEA, namely a limit on the personal jurisdiction such courts
can exercise over defendants apprehended under such acts. At the
very least, the Court should adopt the position put forth in United
States v. Klimavicius-Viloria.s There, the Ninth Circuit held that
while the MDLEA does not textually require a nexus between the
defendant and the United States, such a requirement should be
considered a judicial gloss on the statute that ensures a defendant
is not improperly haled into court in the United States. 9 This
idea mirrors the Court's concerns in International Shoe.6 °
V. DOMESTIC LIMITS ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND
ANALOGIZING THOSE LIMITS TO PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE
MARITIME DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
A. The "Minimum Contacts" Requirement Amongst
the Several States
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington posed the issue
of whether, within the limits of the Due Process Clause, a Dela-
ware corporation rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the
courts of the State of Washington by virtue of the activities it car-
56. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 404.
57. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Int'l Shoe changed the historic
rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877), which required the defendant to
be actually present within the territory of the jurisdiction, to a rule that allowed
personal jurisdiction to be exercised over defendants who maintained "continuous and
systematic" contacts with the forum jurisdiction.
58. See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998).
59. See id. at 1257; see also Morrison, supra note 9, at 637-38.
60. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (discussed infra Part V.A.).
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ried on in Washington.6 Ultimately, the Court, while mitigating
the requirement of actual presence within the jurisdiction as
required by Pennoyer v. Neff,62 held that if a defendant is not pre-
sent within the territory of the forum state, he must have certain
"minimum contacts" 3 with the forum such that "the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.'"" This limit on the jurisdiction of courts ensured
that the exercise of jurisdiction was not arbitrary.
Notice of the suit in International Shoe was "personally
served upon a sales solicitor employed by the appellant [company]
in the State of Washington" and a copy was mailed to the company
at its address in Missouri.6" The appellant appeared and con-
tested jurisdiction, arguing that it was not a corporation of the
State of Washington and it was not doing business in that state.
66
The Court found that despite appellant's arguments to the con-
trary, the company was in fact doing business in Washington and,
because of its sufficient contacts with that State, the assertion of
jurisdiction over appellant was proper.6
In International Shoe, the appellant employed approximately
one dozen employees in Washington; those employees' principle
activities were confined to that state and they were compensated
by commission based on the amount of their sales within that
state.6" The Court found that the activities of those salesmen,
which included, in addition to their actual sales, the rental of
rooms in business buildings or hotels for the purpose of displaying
their shoe stock, were sufficient to justify jurisdiction in Washing-
ton despite the fact that the company did not have an office there
and did not maintain a stock of merchandise there.6 9
International Shoe is an important case because it documents
61. See id. at 311.
62. See id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-34 (requiring a person's
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court in order for that court to render a
binding judgment on the person)).
63. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
64. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
65. Id. at 312.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 321 (holding that appellant rendered itself amenable to suit in
Washington because of the obligations arising out of the activities of its salesmen in
that state).
68. See id. at 313.
69. See id. at 313-14, 319 ("[To the extent that a corporation exercises the
privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protections
of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations...
which require[ ] the corporation to respond to a suit [in that state].").
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the change domestically from a requirement of actual presence
within a forum to one of contact with that forum.7 ° While this
seems like a door-opening move by the Court to widen the net of
personal jurisdiction, the Court's decision is not without a limit.
"Whether due process is satisfied... depend[s] ... upon the qual-
ity and nature of the activity [of a foreign defendant] in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure."71 A jurisdiction may
not make binding a judgment against a defendant who has or
maintains no ties with that jurisdiction.72
This view of personal jurisdiction within the United States
was adopted further in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.73
That case involved a products-liability action brought by respon-
dents against a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale
distributor in an Oklahoma court.74 Respondents had purchased a
car from the automobile retailer in New York and subsequently
left that state en route to Arizona.75 While passing through the
state of Oklahoma, the respondents were involved in an automo-
bile accident in which they were severely injured.76 In this case,
the Court held that where the defendants, both New York corpora-
tions, carried on no activities in Oklahoma and availed themselves
of no privilege or benefit of Oklahoma law, a single accident in
that state did not constitute minimum contacts with Oklahoma
such that the courts of that state could exercise in personam juris-
diction consistent with due process.77
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the defendants did not conduct
any business in Oklahoma; they did not ship or sell any products
to or in that state; and they had no agent to receive process
there.7" As such, the defendants contended that the exercise of
jurisdiction over them by a district court in Oklahoma was viola-
tive of their rights under the Due Process Clause.79 The Court
agreed, going on to state that due process requires the "defendant
70. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), with Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.
71. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
72. See id.
73. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
74. See id. at 287
75. See id. at 288.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 294-95.




be given actual notice of the suit"8 and be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court, which requires the defendant to have
"minimum contacts" with the forum, as established in Interna-
tional Shoe."'
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen then explains the func-
tion and purpose of minimum contacts. First, it "protects the
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconve-
nient forum." 2 Second, it acts to ensure that States do not "reach
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sov-
ereigns in a federal system." 3
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall is a third
example of the Court's recognition of a limitation on personal
jurisdiction. 4 There, Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.
(Helicol) was a Columbian corporation that provided transporta-
tion via helicopter for oil and construction companies in South
America." One of their helicopters crashed in Peru, killing four
American citizens who were on board.8 6 The survivors and repre-
sentatives of the decedents brought a wrongful death action in a
Texas court.8 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine if the corporation maintained sufficient contacts with
the State of Texas such that the Texas state court could assert
jurisdiction over the corporation in an action that did not arise out
of or relate to the corporation's activities in that state. 8
The Chief Executive Officer of Helicol had made one trip to
Texas to discuss a possible contract for transportation with a
joint-venture headquartered in Texas.8 9 The contract was final-
ized at a later date and was executed in Peru.90 Helicol also pur-
chased spare parts from an American helicopter company in
Texas, sent pilots to be trained in Texas and to bring the helicop-
ters to South America, and held bank accounts in New York and
Florida.9
80. Id. at 291 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950)).
81. Id. (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
82. Id. at 292.
83. Id.
84. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
85. See id. at 409.
86. See id. at 410.
87. See id. at 412.
88. See id. at 409.
89. See id. at 410.
90. See id. at 410, 411 n.3.
91. See id. at 411.
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Although Helicol would seem to have had sufficient contacts
with the United States, the Court listed many contacts it did not
have. Specifically, the Court stated that Helicol had never been
authorized to do business in Texas; never had an agent for the
service of process there; never sold any product that reached
Texas; never solicited business in Texas; never signed any con-
tract in Texas; never had or recruited an employee in Texas; never
owned real or personal property in Texas; and never maintained
or owned an office or establishment there.92 In addition, none of
the deceased were domiciled in Texas.93
The Court in Helicopteros again held that due process
requires minimum contacts with the forum state. 9 However, the
Court then went on to break down the minimum contacts test into
a more specific test: whether or not the controversy is related to or
arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum.95 The Court
stated that the "'relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personum juris-
diction."'96 Since the claims against Helicol did not arise out of the
corporation's activities within Texas, the Court analyzed the
nature of the corporation's contacts with the forum state to see if
those contacts constituted the kind of continuous and systematic
contacts necessary to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable
and just.97
The Court also referenced International Shoe for the assertion
that "'the commission of some single or occasional acts of the cor-
porate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liabil-
ity on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon the
state authority to enforce [that obligation or liability]' ".9 The
Court concluded that sending personnel to Texas for training in
connection with the purchase of equipment in that State was not a
significant enough contact with that State to maintain the suit
against Helicol.9 9 Having found that Helicol's contacts with Texas
were not sufficiently continuous and systematic to satisfy the
92. See id. at 418-19.
93. Id. at 411-12.
94. See id. at 414 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
95. See id.
96. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
97. See id. at 415-16; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952).
98. See id. at 418 n.12 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Rosenberg Bros.
& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923) (Brandeis, J., for a unanimous
tribunal))).
99. See id. at 418.
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requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the exercise of jurisdiction over Helicol was improper."0
B. Using the Domestic Test as an Analogous Limit to
Restrict the United States' Extraterritorial
Jurisdictional Reach
The rule of law provided by taking these cases together fur-
nishes an excellent basis for analogy to cases arising under the
MDLEA. Whereas in World-Wide Volkswagen the Court stated
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment lim-
ited the power of state courts to render valid, binding judgments
against nonresident defendants,' such a concept should be
applied through the Fifth Amendment to MDLEA prosecutions.
Additionally, the quoted text above from Helicopteros regarding
the relationship among the defendant, forum and the litigation is
important to limiting the extraterritorial reach of United States'
jurisdiction under the MDLEA. °2
A requirement of minimum contacts in the form of a nexus
between the defendant's conduct and the United States would
serve to protect the defendant's interest in that he could reasona-
bly anticipate where he could be haled into court. A nexus would
immunize him from distant and inconvenient litigation. °3 It also
would serve to effectuate the orderly administration of the law 4
and bring a degree of predictability that would allow defendants
to structure their behavior accordingly.
In addition to protecting the defendant's interests, another
important ground for requiring an analogous concept of minimum
contacts in MDLEA jurisdiction is to protect the equality and sov-
ereignty of nations.0 5 As the Court pointed out in World-Wide
Volkswagen, minimum contacts in the domestic arena serves to
limit the reach of each States' courts within a federal system of
coequal sovereigns.' Likewise, internationally, respect for other
nations should lead U.S. courts to evaluate whether the applica-
100. See id.
101. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
102. See Heliopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
103. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward A
Mixed Theory Of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 209-10 (Oct. 1998).
104. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
105. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(stating that it is "notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign
rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its laws and their enforcement").
106. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
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tion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, noncitizen
defendant is proper." 7 As a mechanism for doing so, the courts
should apply a minimum contacts test.
VI. DUE PROCESS, PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE MARITIME
DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
A. United States v. Perlaza: Facts and Procedural
Posture
The Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Perlaza pro-
vides an excellent example of a U.S. court declining to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant in an MDLEA prosecution after thor-
oughly analyzing whether such jurisdiction was proper.' In the
summer of 2000, the USS De Wert, a Navy frigate, in conjunction
with other United States Navy and Coast Guard ships, was
engaged in maritime drug surveillance of vessels suspected of
drug trafficking in the Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Ecuador,
Columbia, and Peru."9 On September 11, 2000, the crew mem-
bers of the De Wert, along with members of a United States Coast
Guard Law Enforcement Detachment team aboard the frigate,
were alerted by radar to suspicious activity by a speedboat and a
Columbian fishing vessel, the Gran Tauro, which was flying the
Columbian flag. 110 The De Wert dispatched its helicopter to the
site; once the speedboat's crew realized they had been detected,
they jettisoned their cargo, which was later determined to be
2,000 kilograms of cocaine and several 55-gallon gasoline
drums."' The Navy and Coast Guard crew members suspected
the Columbian fishing vessel to be serving as a logistical support
vessel for the speedboat by providing gasoline for the speedboat's
run between Columbia and Central Mexico."1 2 The five speedboat
crew members and seven crew members of the Columbian vessel
were apprehended and later prosecuted under the MDLEA." 3
Prior to trial, the defendants sought to dismiss their indict-
ments, arguing that the MDLEA was unconstitutional because it
did not require an effect on interstate or foreign commerce; that
107. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1985).
108. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2006).
109. See id. at 1152.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1053.
113. See id.
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the district court lacked jurisdiction over the defendants because
the Government failed to allege that the speedboat was a stateless
vessel; and that the Government did not have jurisdiction because
no evidence demonstrating a nexus between the defendants and
the United States was produced."'
The district court rejected these arguments.115 Two of the
defendants pled guilty; the remaining ten were convicted after a
trial by jury.1 6 Three defendants were convicted of conspiracy to
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute aboard a vessel in
violation of sections 1903(a)1 7 , (c). and (j)119 of the MDLEA and of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute aboard a vessel in
violation of sections 1903(a), (c)(1)(A)120 and (f).12' The other seven
defendants were convicted of only the conspiracy to possess
charge. 22
B. The Circuit Court's Discussion of the
Constitutionality of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act
On appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
convictions of the defendants and held that the district court erro-
neously exercised jurisdiction over the defendants without requir-
ing the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of certain facts necessary to establish jurisdiction.'23
The circuit court first discussed the defendant's argument that the
114. See id. at 1157-58.
115. See id. at 1158.
116. See id. at 1153.
117. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act [MDLEA], 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a)
(2002) ("It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel ... subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States ... to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to
possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.").
118. Id. § 1093(c) (setting out what a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" includes).
119. Id. § 1903(j) ("Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense
defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for
the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.").
120. Id. § 1903(c)(1)(A) ("[A] vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
includes a vessel without nationality...").
121. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1157-58; see also MDLEA § 1903(f) ("Any person who
violates this section shall be tried in the United States district court at the point of
entry where that person enters the United States, or in the United States District
Court of the District of Columbia.").
122. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1158, 1179.
123. See id. at 1153.
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MDLEA is "unconstitutional because it fails to require an effect on
interstate or foreign commerce."'24 The district court had rejected
this argument, ruling "that the MDLEA was properly enacted...
[under the] Piracies and Felonies Clause of the United States
Constitution."125
The circuit court likewise rejected the defendants' assertions
by upholding its prior decisions in United States v. Aikins 2 and
United States v. Davis,127 both holding that the MDLEA is consti-
tutional and was a proper exercise of Congressional power under
the Piracies and Felonies Clause. 28 The court noted that even if
these findings are to be considered dicta in Aikins and Davis,
United States v. Moreno-Morilla expressly held that the MDLEA
is constitutional.1 29 The court concluded its analysis of the consti-
tutionality of the Act by declaring that inasmuch as trafficking in
narcotics is universally condemned, there should be no reason to
conclude that it is fundamentally unfair for Congress to provide
for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics on the
high seas. 3 ° This reference to conduct universally condemned by
law abiding nations provides an excellent foreshadowing to the




124. Id. at 1158.
125. Id. at 1158-59; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
126. See United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
defendants caught on the high seas by the U.S. Coast Guard southeast of the
Hawaiian Islands with approximately 21,000 pounds of marijuana aboard their vessel
were subject to the MDLEA and that the MDLEA was not unconstitutional as applied
to those defendants because Congress intended that Act to apply to conduct on the
high seas).
127. See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a
defendant caught approximately 100 miles west of California with 7,000 pounds of
marijuana aboard his vessel was subject to prosecution under the MDLEA and that
the Constitution gave to Congress the power to give extraterritorial effect to the
MDLEA through the Piracies and Felonies Clause).
128. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1158-59; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
129. See United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1156 (2004) ("Congress ... was acting within its constitutionally conferred
authority when it passed the MDLEA. That authority is expressly conferred by
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 [of the Constitution] .... ") (citing United States v.
Ledesma-Cuesta, 347 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2003)).
130. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1160.
131. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 404; see also Perlaza, 439 F.3d at
1162-63.
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C. The Requirements of Statutory and Constitutional
Jurisdiction When Applying the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act
The Perlaza court then goes on to draw an important distinc-
tion between statutory and constitutional jurisdiction under the
MDLEA. 132 Section 1903(c) of the MDLEA lays out the statutory
bases for jurisdiction. 133 Among these "[v]essel[s] subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States"'34 are vessels without national-
ity;135 "vessel[s] assimilated to a vessel without nationality";136 ves-
sels registered to a foreign nation where the flag nation has
consented to enforcement of United States law by the United
States;137 "vessel[s] located within the customs waters of the
United States";' and vessels located within the territorial waters
of another nation where that nation has consented to enforcement
of United States law by the United States. 39 The Government
must satisfy at least one of these bases for jurisdiction in order to
prosecute an offender under the MDLEA 4 °
Separate and apart from the Government's obligation of prov-
ing statutory jurisdiction, however, is the requirement of constitu-
tional jurisdiction. The Perlaza court took the view that a nexus
between the prohibited conduct and the United States is a condi-
tion precedent to applying the MDLEA extraterritorially in order
132. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1160.
133. See Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act [MDLEA], 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)
(2002).
134. Id.
135. See id. § 1903(c)(1)(A); see also id. § 1903(c)(2) (defining a vessel without
nationality to include vessels aboard which the master or person in charge makes a
claim of registry and that claim is either denied by the flag nation whose registry is
claimed or the flagged nation does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the
vessel is of its nationality and vessels where the master or person in charge fails to
make a claim of nationality when so requested to do so by an officer of the United
States who is empowered to enforce provisions of U.S. law); Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1160
(noting that a vessel without nationality is also commonly referred to as a stateless
vessel).
136. MDLEA, § 1903(c)(1)(B); see also Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 6,
Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/genevahs.
htm ("A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according
to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any
other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.").
137. MDLEA, § 1903(c)(1)(C).
138. Id. § 1903(c)(1)(D); see also 19 U.S.C.A. § 1401(j) (2006) (defining "custom
waters" as the waters within four leagues of the coast of the United States). One
league is equal to three miles.
139. MDLEA, § 1903(c)(1)(E).
140. See United States v. Medjuck (Medjuck III), 156 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1998).
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to ensure that application of the statute to the defendant is not
arbitrary and fundamentally unfair.' This sentiment echoes the
concerns of International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen."' As
between the several states, the Supreme Court has stated that the
Due Process Clause does not allow for one state to put forth a
binding judgment in personam against a defendant who has no
contacts, ties or relations with that state. The International
Shoe Court went on to hold that when a defendant maintains suf-
ficient contacts with a state or avails himself of the benefits or
privileges of that state's laws, it is not unreasonable to haul that
defendant into a court in that state and force him to defend a suit
brought there.'" This concern regarding the fairness of where the
defendant should have to defend a suit is, in this author's opinion,
the same concern the Perlaza court references when requiring a
nexus. 145
In Perlaza, the district court found that because the speed-
boat was a "stateless vessel" 46 and because the Colombian govern-
ment had consented to the United States' enforcement of United
States law aboard the Gran Tauro, there was statutory jurisdic-
tion over both vessels.14' Furthermore, the district court found
that because the speedboat was stateless, the United States Gov-
141. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. Medjuck (Medjuck 11), 48 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 828 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1256-59 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Khan,
35 F.3d 426, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court,
however, notes that the exception to this rule is where a vessel is deemed stateless.
See id., 439 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 829). In that situation,
there is no requirement of a nexus between those on board and the United States
before jurisdiction may be exercised over them. See id.
142. See discussion supra Part V.
143. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (citation omitted).
144. See id.
145. However, the Perlaza court does point out that the circuits are split on this
requirement and cites to cases in the Fifth, Third and First Circuits which do not
require a nexus. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161 (citing United States v. Suerte, 291
F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d
Cir. 2002); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (Hall, J.,
sitting by designation)).
146. No flags of any kind were seen to be flying on the speedboat, nor where there
any markings, hull numbers, name or home-port inscriptions observed. However, two
defendants on the speedboat stated that they were "from" Colombia, as was the boat.
The circuit court declared that this statement could fairly be read as a statement of
nationality and that by not submitting the disputed issue of the speedboat's
nationality to the jury, the district court erred. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1165.
147. See id. at 1161.
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ernment was not required to establish constitutional jurisdiction
by the showing of a nexus between the defendants and the United
States."' However, the lower court did point out that a nexus is
ordinarily required for foreign-flagged vessels like the Gran
Tauro, but since the Gran Tauro had been aiding and abetting the
speedboat, the Gran Tauro defendants would "'stand in the shoes
of the principles, specifically the [speedboat] defendants, for juris-
dictional purposes."149 In effect, the lower court waived the nexus
requirement for the Gran Tauro defendants.
D. Constitutional Jurisdiction and International Law
The circuit court's discussion of constitutional jurisdiction is
bound up with the concepts of the protective principle5 ° and uni-
versal jurisdiction,151 both concepts that the court ultimately found
not to eradicate the Government's obligation to establish both
statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over the defendants.'52
The majority stated that in the Ninth Circuit, the protective prin-
ciple is merely part of the consideration of whether a nexus exists
and is not to be considered a substitute for the nexus. 15  As dis-
cussed in United States v. Peterson, the protective principle is a
proper basis for jurisdiction when the prohibited activity threat-
ens the security or governmental functions of a nation.' The
Peterson court pronounced that drug trafficking, even when no
actual effect on the United States is shown, may properly be pre-
vented under the protective principle due to the threat it presents
to the Unites States' ability to function."'
However, there must be a limit on the extent to which the
148. See id. (citation omitted).
149. Id. (quoting the District Court).
150. The protective principle, as recognized by the Second Circuit, gives a state
"jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside
its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental
functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under the laws of
states that have reasonably developed legal systems." United States v. Pizzarusso,
388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 33).
151. The Government argued that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction
under the United States' universal jurisdiction to prevent piracy, slave trading and
other universally condemned activities. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1162.
152. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161-64; see also United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d
1088, 1114 (noting "that the Government bears the burden of establishing that the
statutory requirements of... jurisdiction imposed by the MDLEA are met").
153. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161-62.
154. See id. at 1162 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir.
1987)).
155. See Peterson, 812 F.2d at 493.
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United States may exercise its jurisdiction under the guise of the
protective principle. First, the Perlaza court notes that the lan-
guage in Peterson regarding the applicability of the protective
principle to drug trafficking is dicta."'6 Second, they note that "[a]
broad reading [of the protective principle] would allow the United
States to police any international conduct 'against [any] important
state interests""'1 7 and would also allow the United States to pro-
hibit "foreigners on foreign ships 500 miles offshore from possess-
ing drugs that.. . might be bound for Canada, South America, or
Zanzibar... .""I The court concluded its questioning of the appli-
cability of the protective principle by stating that the Ninth Cir-
cuit has rejected it as an independent basis for jurisdiction and
instead requires a "constitutionally sufficient nexus".
159
The court then turns to consider the Government's argument
that jurisdiction was proper under the universality principle and
concludes that this argument is simply a weaker version of the
government's protective principle argument.6 ° Ultimately, the
court concludes that international law principles, such as the pro-
tective principle and universal jurisdiction, should be used as a
"rough guide of whether a sufficient nexus exists between the
defendant and the United States" so that the application of the
Act does not violate due process."' But too much emphasis on
such international law principles, the court cautions, might cause
a court to lose sight of the decisive question: would application of
the statue to the defendant be arbitrary and fundamentally
unfair?'62 Therefore, neither the protective principle nor universal
jurisdiction vitiate the government's obligation to establish both
statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over the defendants it
156. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1162.
157. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988)).
158. Id. (quoting Robinson, 843 F.2d at 3 (questioning the reasonableness of a
broad reading of the "protective principle")).
159. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1162 n.16 (quoting United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp.
774 (N.D. Cal. 1992)).
160. See id. at 1162-63. Perlaza notes that the government's universal jurisdiction
argument rests exclusively on two Eleventh Circuit cases, United States v. Marino-
Garcia and United States v. Gonzalez. See United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d
1373, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting "a growing consensus among nations to include
drug trafficking as a universally prohibited crime"); United States v. Gonzalez, 776
F.2d 931, 939-40 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Marino-Garcia for the proposition that
"conduct may be forbidden if it has a potential adverse effect and is generally
recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems").
161. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1162 (citing United States v. Davis, 902 F.2d 245, 249
(9th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original).
162. See id.
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seeks to prosecute under the MDLEA.
16 3
E. Limiting Jurisdiction Under the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act by Looking to Domestic
Limitations
The limit that should exist to curtail such potentially far-
reaching jurisdiction by the United States should be a concept
analogous to the idea of minimum contacts that is used to limit
the personal jurisdiction of state courts within the several States.
In Perlaza, the defendants were not United States citizens, were
not captured within United States territory, and had no contacts
with the United States.' They had not availed themselves of any
of the privileges or benefits of United States law and it was not
proven that their cargo was headed for the United States.65 Anal-
ogizing these facts to the analysis in International Shoe demon-
strates that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over these
defendants would be arbitrary, unfair, and would offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'66
Domestically, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum
state. 67 In the federal court system, due process is governed by
the Fifth Amendment, but incorporates ideals similar to those of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'68 Requiring minimum contacts to
satisfy due process is a form of protection afforded to the defen-
dant so that it is not unreasonable to expect him to defend the suit
in the forum where it is brought.'69 These contacts must be "con-
tinuous and systematic." 7 ° Without such minimum contacts,
under the International Shoe analysis, due process is violated and
therefore, there can be no binding judgment against the
defendant.''
Most cases prosecuted under the MDLEA involve defendants
apprehended in international waters off the coast of South
163. See id. at 1163; see also United States v. Medjuck (Medjuck III), 156 F.3d 916,
918 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Government must demonstrate the existence of a
nexus).
164. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1154.
165. See id. at 1169, 1175.
166. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
167. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law")
169. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 319 (citations omitted).
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America.'72 When there is either no proof that the drugs are ulti-
mately destined for the United States or there is proof that they
are destined for a different country, prosecuting these offenders in
United States courts seems to go against all notions of due process
and "fair play and substantial justice."173 In United States v. Mar-
tinez-Hidalgo, the Third Circuit rejected the defendant's conten-
tion that the United States did not have jurisdiction when the
government did not show that he intended for the drugs to ulti-
mately reach the United States.174 But allowing such jurisdiction
would permit the United States to prosecute a defendant with no
contacts to the United States. It is difficult to reconcile this posi-
tion with the United States' rules governing personal jurisdiction
as between a state and a citizen of a different state.
As between the United States and a nonresident, noncitizen
defendant, the Supreme Court has held that due process is not
offended when there are sufficient contacts between the state and
the foreign party.175 In Perlaza, the court cites to Klimavicius-
Viloria for the proposition that the nexus requirement, while not a
textual requirement of the MDLEA, is a "judicial gloss applied to
ensure that a defendant is not improperly haled before a court for
trial ... [It] serves the same purpose as the 'minimum contacts'
test in [domestic] personal jurisdiction."176 Where a defendant has
submitted himself to the laws of one nation (i.e. the foreign-flag
nation), he would have a legitimate expectation that he would not
have to defend a suit brought against him in another nation and
that other nations would not be entitled to exercise jurisdiction
over him without some nexus that would make such jurisdiction
reasonable.177
172. See, e.g. United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Moreno, 199 F. App'x 839 (11th Cir. 2006).
173. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citations omitted).
174. See United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (rejecting as
inadequate defendant's contention that the district court did not have jurisdiction
over his prosecution under 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and (j) where the government
did not show that he intended that the drugs would reach the United States because
the MDLEA allows for prosecution in the United States regardless of the destination
of the drugs). The court also had jurisdiction under the MDLEA because the
defendant claimed his vessel was Columbian and Columbia gave consent for the
Coast Guard to board and check the vessel for documentation. See id. at 1054.
175. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); see
also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
176. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1168 (citing United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d
819, 830 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d
1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998))).
177. See id. (citing Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1257).
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Not only would due process be offended by haling a defendant
into a foreign court where he maintains no ties to the forum, but it
would also seem to violate the concept forum non conveniens."s
That doctrine requires the court to take into account such factors
as the choice of law applicable to the dispute and the potential for
hardship to the defendant when deciding if exercising jurisdiction
is reasonable.'79
The discussion regarding jurisdiction in Perlaza concludes
with the holding that even if there is consent or some other basis
for exerting statutory jurisdiction, the Government must prove
some detrimental effect within, or nexus to, the United States.180
Nexus is an essential part of the jurisdictional analysis that
United States case law requires 8 ' in order to ensure that the
United States does not become a world police force, exerting its
authority far beyond its territorial boundaries in a way that
eclipses the rights of nonresident aliens.8 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, while properly
enacted under Congress' constitutional powers "[tio define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offenses against the Law of Nations""s3 extends the jurisdiction of
the United States to an improperly wide spectrum of acts and
offenders. The effect of the statute is to make the United States a
police force against drug trafficking in the entire Western Hemi-
sphere, and potentially the entire world. Without something to tie
these offenders' conduct to the Unites States, they are deprived of
due process, proper notice, and a convenient forum in which to
defend their cases, all things the United States judicial system
178. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (stating that
dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens is appropriate when trial in the
plaintiffs chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant (citing Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947))).
179. See id.
180. Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1169 (citing United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 739 (9th
Cir. 2002) for the proposition that under the territorial jurisdiction theory,
jurisdiction is proper if the conduct performed outside the United States produces
detrimental effects within the United States, or in other words, produces a nexus
between the defendant and the United States).
181. See id.
182. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 722 cmt. a (noting that the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment safeguard individual rights and prescribed rights of
persons, not just of United States citizens).
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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grants to domestic defendants in state courts under the rule put
forth in International Shoe.8 As it stands now, Congress is able
to exercise its Piracies and Felonies power in such a way that it
affects foreign nationals whose conduct occurred outside the
United States and has no provable link to the United States. This
inequity of treatment in United States' courts between United
States citizens and nonresident, noncitizens cannot continue.
184. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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